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prosecutorial abuse of the power to subpoena.22 As a result, wit-
nesses will be forced to rely upon the prosecutor's good faith judg-
ment as to relevancy and comply with the subpoena duces te-
cum, 2 29 or be subject to criminal contempt proceedings.23 0 It is
submitted that this stricture provides an additional reason for
placing the burden to establish the relevancy of requested items
upon the prosecutor.23'
Sherri M. Tepperman
Retention of counsel in connection with grand jury inquiry does
not preclude subsequent investigation, in the absence of counsel,
which uncovers new crimes
The fulcrum of the New York courts' enforcement of a crimi-
228 Traditionally, it has been considered important for the grand jury, while serving in
its investigatory capacity, to be impartial, thereby protecting the rights of private citizens.
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Ideally, the grand
jury should not be a tool of the government or the courts, but rather an instrument to be
used for the benefit of the people. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 174, 175-77 (1963). In recent years, however, prosecutorial domination of the grand jury
has increased. See People v. Colebut, 86 Misc. 2d 729, 734-35, 383 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Murov, An Examination of the Grand Jury: Inquest and Quest, 51
N.Y.S.B.J. 115, 116-17 (1979).
229 The Virag Court noted that there is a presumption of regularity accorded to official
acts of individuals functioning under an oath of office. 54 N.Y.2d at 443, 430 N.E.2d at 1252,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200; W. RICHARDSON, supra note 197, § 72, at 49. The potential exists,
however, for prosecutors to act overzealously, especially during investigations of nursing
homes, where widespread abuse of the Medicaid system has already been uncovered. See C.
HYNES, supra note 221, at 36-50; Murov, supra note 228, at 134.
221 If a witness fails to comply with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum, he is subject to
a criminal contempt citation. Manning v. Valente, 272 App. Div. 358, 361, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88,
92 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947); see 9 N.Y. JUR. Contempt § 47
(1960).
231 Interestingly, the burden to establish relevancy has been placed upon the prosecutor
in the context of subpoenas ad testificandum (subpoena to testify). In In re Additional Jan-
uary 1979 Grand Jury (Albany Supreme Court v. Doe), 50 N.Y.2d 14, 405 N.E.2d 194, 427
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1980), for example, the Court reiterated the proposition that a witness may
not be compelled to answer irrelevant questions. Id. at 21, 405 N.E.2d at 199-200, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 955. Indeed, if a witness "harbors a reasonable suspicion" that a line of ques-
tioning is irrelevant, the court may be called upon to determine the validity of that suspi-
cion. Id. The onus is then placed upon the prosecutor to demonstrate the relevancy of his
inquiries. Id. It is submitted that this rule should be extended to cover witnesses who doubt
the relevancy of requested materials.
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nal defendant's right to counseP23 is the notion that the right, once
deemed to have "attached," cannot be waived outside the presence
of counsel.23 3 This concept of "indelible attachment" has been de-
veloped to prohibit custodial police interrogation, outside the pres-
ence of counsel, of a suspect who is represented on a pending
charge, as to that charge or other, unrelated charges. 23 4 A further
13' See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978). Justice Stewart noted that "f[in
an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the
assistance of counsel". Id. The right to counsel under the New York State Constitution,
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6, has been characterized as affording "protections... beyond those
of the Federal [Constitution]-well before certain Federal rights were recognized." People v.
Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978); see, e.g.,
People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 32, 417 N.E.2d 501, 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (1980);
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968);
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d'148, 153, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (1963).
The liberal expansion of the right to counsel in New York over the last 20 years began
with the Court of Appeals' determination that the admission into evidence of statements
made by an accused after indictment, in the absence of his attorney, was a violation of the
right. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550-51, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25
(1960). This right subsequently was deemed to attach at the postarraignment, preindict-
ment stage, People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164-65, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427,
428 (1962), and ultimately was upheld when an individual who was in custody but had not
been indicted or arraigned asked to confer with an attorney, People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d
148, 153, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (1963). See generally People v. Settles,
46 N.Y.2d 154, 160-62, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614-16, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877-79 (1978); People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483-84, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897-98, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421-22 (1976);
Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of
New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 157, 178-86 (1979).
233 See People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663,
666 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 153, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841,
844 (1963). Once an attorney enters a proceeding on behalf of a defendant, the right to
counsel attaches and may not be waived outside the attorney's presence. See People v. Set-
tles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978). The nonwaiver
rule is based on the notion that a criminal defendant faced with the "awesome prosecutorial
machinery of the State" must have the advice of counsel before he forfeits the essential
right to the assistance of counsel. People v. Grimaldi, 52 N.Y.2d 611, 616, 422 N.E.2d 493,
495, 439 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (1981). Indeed, the guidance of counsel may be more important
'in the waiver decision than at the trial itself. Id.
The nonwaiver rule articulated in Donovan and Arthur was at one point held to be
"merely a theoretical statement" and "not the New York law." People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d
155, 158, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1970).
Since Robles and Arthur were factually almost identical, future application of the right to
counsel in New York was left uncertain. See W. RICHARDSON, supra note 197, § 545, at 545-
46. This confusion persisted until the Court, in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976), reaffirmed the basis of the Donovan-Arthur rule. Id.
at 483, 384 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
234 The Court first articulated the concept of "indelible attachment," or nonwaivability,
of the right to counsel as triggered by commencement of a formal criminal proceeding or "at
an earlier stage if there has been sufficient judicial activity." People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d
218, 221, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1345-46, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (1980); see People v. Settles, 46
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extension of the right to counsel precludes noncustodial interroga-
tion about matters with respect to which a suspect has not been
charged but has retained counsel.2 5 Recently, in People v. Fer-
rara,2 31 the Court of Appeals held that the right to counsel cannot
be invoked to shield a suspect who has retained counsel from po-
lice investigation into new crimes that are still in the planning
stages.2 37
In Ferrara, the defendant, a laundry and linen supplier, was
subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury investigating kickbacks
to nursing home operators.238 At his second grand jury appearance,
the defendant testified that he neither knew of nor participated in
any kickback schemes2 3  The prosecutor shortly thereafter came
N.Y.2d 154, 164, 385 N.E.2d 612, 617, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 880 (1978). A suspect who requests
counsel during a custodial interrogation enjoys the same indelible attachment of the right as
one who has actually obtained counsel. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400
N.E.2d 360, 361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980).
During the period that the Donovan-Arthur rule was in doubt, see note 233 supra,
additional confusion arose on the application of the right to counsel to custodial qjuestioning
on matters unrelated to those for which the defendant was represented. See People v. Rog-
ers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 397 N.E.2d 709, 712-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (1979). This problem
was resolved when the Court held that information obtained by such questioning, when
police know of the representation, could not be used against the defendant. Id. at 173, 397
N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. The Rogers Court emphasized the role of the attorney,
rather than the state, as the ultimate arbiter of permissible questioning. Id.
"' People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 31-32, 417 N.E.2d 501, 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211
(1980). In Skinner, the defendant, in response to repeated police contacts concerning a re-
cent murder, retained counsel who instructed the police not to question the defendant in his
absence. Id. at 27, 417 N.E.2d at 502, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 208. Subsequently, detectives who
were assigned to serve the defendant with an order to show cause encouraged him to make
damaging admissions which were admitted at trial. Id. at 28, 417 N.E.2d at 502-03, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 208-09. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, noting that the defen-
dant's waiver of his right to counsel in the absence of his attorney was ineffective, notwith-
standing the fact that he was not in custody and no formal action had been commenced
against him. Id. at 31-32, 417 N.E.2d at 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
The Skinner Court observed that whether the defendant was in custody at the time of
questioning was not controlling. Id. at 30, 417 N.E.2d at 504, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 210. The
pivotal fact, noted the majority, was that by retaining counsel, the defendant had "unequiv-
ocally indicated" that he was incompetent to deal with the authorities on his own. Id. at 32,
417 N.E.2d at 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211. The Court concluded that any waiver of the right to
counsel is hieffective where the accused is known by police to have retained counsel on the
matter about which he is questioned. Id.
236 54 N.Y.2d 498, 430 N.E.2d 1275, 446 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1981).
237 Id. at 508, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
238 Id. at 502-03, 430 N.E.2d at 1276, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 223. The defendant testified
before three grand juries, and was granted immunity for each appearance. Id. at 502-03, 505,
430 N.E.2d at 1276-77, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 223-24. He appeared without counsel before the first
grand jury only. Id. at 503, 430 N.E.2d at 1276, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
239 Id. When the defendant was subpoenaed before the second grand jury, he was in-
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into possession of evidence sufficient to indict Ferrara for perjury
during the second grand jury appearance.4 0 Contemporaneous
with this development was an offer by Alex Sreter, a nursing home
operator, to cooperate in the investigation. 4' Sreter subsequently
attended a meeting set up by Ferrara's partner,2 42 and recorded
both Ferrara's offers of kickbacks and his references to similar ar-
rangements made by him in the past.243 The defendant was sub-
poenaed before a third grand jury and, unaware of the recorded
conversations, denied involvement in kickback schemes with Sreter
or others.244 Based on this testimony, he was indicted for per-
jury.245 A motion to suppress the tapes, based on violation of the
right to counsel, was denied, and defendant's subsequent convic-
tion was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second
Department. 40
A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed. 47 Writing for the
Court, Chief Judge Cooke summarily dismissed the alleged viola-
tion of right to counsel since, ab initio, no right to counsel had
attached.24 8 A defendant who has been neither indicted nor sub-
formed that there was reason to believe that he had perjured himself during his first appear-
ance. Id.
240 Id. Although the defendant categorically had denied, in his two grand jury appear-
ances, any knowledge of or involvement in wrongdong, the prosecutor nevertheless elected
not to indict him for perjury, and subpoenaed him before a third grand jury to "give him an
opportunity to testify truthfully and aid the investigation." Id. at 505, 430 N.E.2d at 1277,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
... Id. at 503-04, 430 N.E.2d at 1276, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 223. Sreter's offer of cooperation
was made in return for a reduction in criminal charges that were about to be brought
against him. Id.
242 Id. at 504, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224. Sreter was contacted by the
defendant's partner, Solomon, about servicing one of Sreter's homes. Id. at 504, 430 N.E.2d
at 1276, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 223. Solomon, however, only attended the initial meeting; all subse-
quent meetings were between Ferrara and Sreter. Id., 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at
224.
243 Id. The defendant explained his methods for distributing the kickback and assured
Sreter that he was very careful and would never get caught. Id. Ultimately, Sreter refused
the kickback and terminated all business with the defendant's company. Id.
244 Id. at 505, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224. At the grand jury hearing, the
defendant was asked specific questions concerning his dealings with Sreter. Id.
245 Id.
24' 78 App. Div. 2d 904, 435 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1980) (mem.). The defendant was
indicted on four counts of perjury and was convicted of the three counts based on the Sreter
conversations. 54 N.Y.2d at 505, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
247 54 N.Y.2d at 509, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
248 Id. at 505-06, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224. Chief Judge Cooke observed
that retention of counsel in response to a grand jury inquiry does not foreclose police from
securing, from a defendant who is not in custody, an indication of intent to commit a new
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jected to custodial interrogation was found to enjoy no constitu-
tional right to representation.2 9 The Court emphatically declined
to find such a right triggered by a meeting with police or police
informants in which future criminal activity is planned.25 0 The
Court relied heavily on the fact that the defendant's partner, and
not the police informant, initiated the meeting in which the defen-
dant solicited a new crime, and suggested that it might have held
differently if the informant had affirmatively encouraged the de-
fendant to reveal past crimes.2 51 The defendant's citation of the
noncustodial right to counsel upheld in People v. Skinner252 was
thus deemed inapposite, since the defendant in Skinner was in fact
interrogated about a past crime for which he had engaged coun-
sel.253 The Court noted that the right to counsel exists to offset the
inequality of position between one accused of a crime and the
state; it was never intended to preclude police investigation into
new crimes.254
The decision in Ferrara resists categorization as another in the
line of cases which have explored the ambit of right to counsel in
custodial and noncustodial settings.2 55 A characterization of the ev-
crime of the type presently under investigation. Id. Additionally, the Court stated that the
fact of representation does not enable a grand jury witness to evade a perjury prosecution
based on such statements. Id.
24 Id. at 506, 430 N.E.2d at 1277-78, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25. The Court found no at-
tachment of the right to counsel under the United States or the New York Constitutions.
Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6. The Court relied on several federal
cases which required charges to be filed against a defendant in custody before his constitu-
tional right to an attorney attached. See 54 N.Y.2d at 506, 430 N.E.2d at 1278, 446 N.Y.S.2d
at 225 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 & n.4 (1980); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966)).
250 54 N.Y.2d at 505-06, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224. The Court stated that
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1963), were inapposite since those cases involved evidence of prior crimes elicited by police
informers for which the defendants already had been indicted, see 447 U.S. at 265-66; 377
U.S. at 201, while the Sreter tapes constituted evidence of future crimes. 54 N.Y.2d at 505-
06, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
21 54 N.Y.2d at 508, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226. The Court simply did
not find the sixth amendment implicated by covert police investigation into an uncommit-
ted crime with which the suspect ultimately is charged. Id. at 506, 430 N.E.2d at 1278, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 225.
2-52 52 N.Y.2d 24, 417 N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980); see note 235 supra.
253 54 N.Y.2d at 508, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
254 Id.
2" The two factors upon which the New York cases dealing with attachment of an ac-
cused's right to counsel have focused are: (1) whether the suspect was in custody when ques-
tioned; and (2) whether the questioning related to the same subject matter for which he had
retained counsel. See People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 30-31, 417 N.E.2d 501, 504-05, 436
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idence obtained in the Sreter meetings as "unrelated" to the grand
jury investigation into kickbacks is tenuous.256 Yet if these tape-
recorded conversations, elicited in a noncustodial setting, did in-
deed refer to the same crime for which Ferrara was being investi-
gated and had retained counsel, the case would seem to fall
squarely within the Skinner rule, 57 and the Court's failure to ap-
ply it might be labeled retrogressive. It is suggested, however, that
the Ferrara Court's use of the phrase "new crime" is a temporal,
rather than a substantive distinction, which focuses on the as yet
uncommitted nature of the crime. The decision is thus not subject
to analysis under cases dealing with interrogation about "related"
or "unrelated" crimes which already have been committed.2 58 The
thrust of Ferrara is instead the wholesale exception from the right
to counsel rule of an uncommitted crime still in the planning stage,
regardless of whether such-crime would, as a matter of substantive
law, be classified as related to the crime for which the accused is
represented.""
Viewed in this light, Ferrara presents less of an anomaly, but
the defendant's peculiar status may justify a limitation of the hold-
ing to the grand jury context. 60 As an immunized witness, Ferrara
N.Y.S.2d 207, 210-11 (1980); People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 172-73, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713-
14, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 21-22 (1979); notes 233-235 and accompanying text supra. The Ferrara
Court, faced with a noncustodial situation, apparently has moved beyond the established
construct of "related" and "unrelated" questioning, and has isolated questioning about
"new crimes" as a category to which right to counsel does not attach. See 54 N.Y.2d at 505,
430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
"I It may be argued that there is no logical basis for distinguishing between the subject
matter of the grand jury investigation which prompted Ferrara to retain an attorney and the
subject matter of the Sreter conversations, since both dealt with the defendant's dealings
with nursing homes. See 54 N.Y.2d at 504, 430 N.E.2d at 1277, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 224; note
235 supra.
257 See 52 N.Y.2d at 32, 417 N.E.2d at 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211; note 235 supra.
258 See note 255 supra. The Ferrara Court distinguished the line of cases which deter-
mine when the right to counsel attaches, observing that none of the decisions "support the
novel theory advanced by defendant." 54 N.Y.2d at 506, 430 N.E.2d at 1278, 446 N.Y.S.2d
at 225.
2-5 54 N.Y.2d at 508, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226. The Ferrara Court ex-
pressed a blanket refusal to recognize a defendant's right to counsel during questioning
which reveals a new crime "merely because the individual has retained counsel during the
investigation of earlier criminality." Id.
20 But see People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 474, 479, 430 N.E.2d 1264, 1267, 446
N.Y.S.2d 211, 214 (1981). In Middleton, a ruling similar to Ferrara was applied in a criminal
case arising outside the sphere of a grand jury proceeding. A noncustodial defendant offered
a bribe to police officers after he had requested counsel. During further questioning concern-
ing the bribe, statements were elicited which resulted in discovery of cocaine in the defen-
dant's possession. Id. at 477-78, 430 N.E.2d at 1265-66, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 212-13. The Court
[Vol. 56:742
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could not have been prosecuted for statements relating to either
past or future crimes; his reference to past crimes, made in the
context of a new kickback offer, was passed over by the Court as
merely a fortuitous occurrence.281 In the case of a criminal suspect
who enjoys no such grant of immunity, the Ferrara holding
presents a danger. While statements pertaining to past related
crimes, elicited through noncustodial police interrogation of a sus-
pect who has retained counsel, would clearly be inadmissible,262
statements that relate to new crimes, whether related or not,
would, under Ferrara, form a basis for prosecution. 23 Admissibil-
ity would thus turn on what a suspect happened to say in a partic-
ular police encounter, leading courts to work backward from the
result of the encounter to justify the initial investigatory tech-
nique.264 It is submitted that the propriety of police contact with
upheld the defendant's conviction on both charges, noting that even though the defendant
had requested an attorney, he was not permitted to invoke the right to counsel with respect
to a "new crime committed in the presence of the officers." Id. at 479, 430 N.E.2d at 1267,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 214. The Court further observed that any statements elicited during ques-
tioning about the "new crime" were admissible, regardless of whether they referred to previ-
ous criminal activity. Id. at 482, 430 N.E.2d at 1269, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 216. Thus, as noted in
the dissent, the majority ruling effectively deprives the defendant of his right to counsel
because he has "committed a substantively unrelated and independent crime." Id. at 484,
430 N.E.2d at 1269, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 216. (Jones, J., dissenting).
'61 54 N.Y.2d at 508, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226. The Ferrara Court
stressed that the defendant voluntarily admitted his prior kickback arrangements while ini-
tiating a "new crime," noting that the defendant undertook the risk of making incriminating
statements to a government agent. Id. When discussing competing offers with the defen-
dant, however, Sreter stated that "price was not everything." Id. at 504, 430 N.E.2d at 1277,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 224. Thus, there may have been some inducement to elicit the incriminating
statements. Indeed, the use of informants to obtain information has been equated with di-
rect interrogation of an accused. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980). In
Henry, the defendant made incriminating statements to an informer while incarcerated in a
federal prison. Id. at 267. The Supreme Court held that the statements were elicited in
violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Id. at 274. Since he was unaware that his fellow
inmate was a paid informant acting under instructions of the government, he could not
effectively waive his right to an attorney. Id. at 273. The Court observed that no less strin-
gent a standard should be applied when the accused is prompted by an undisclosed under-
cover informant than when he is speaking directly to government officials. Id. at 272-73.
Moreover, the Court stressed that no distinction should be made as to which party initiated
the conversation or raised the subject which brought out the incriminating statements. Id.
at 272 & n.10.
262 People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 32, 417 N.E.2d 501, 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211
(1980); see note 235 supra.
263 See 54 N.Y.2d at 508, 430 N.E.2d at 1279, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 226; note 259 and accom-
panying text supra.
2 See note 260 supra (discussing People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 474, 430 N.E.2d
1264, 446 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1981)). In Middleton, the offer of the bribe was the "new crime"
used to justify the questioning which led to the revelation of the defendant's prior crime
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an accused who is represented by counsel should not be evaluated
subjectively after the fact, but must be scrutinized as of the time
of its inception for potential exacerbation of the imbalance be-
tween the suspect and the state.2 5
William J. Birney
Transfer of custody is dependent upon best interests of the child,
not upon whether particular changed circumstances can be de-
nominated extraordinary
Awards of child custody typically are based upon "the best in-
terests of the child. 262 This standard has been applied in initial
after he had requested legal assistance. Id. at 479, 430 N.E.2d at 1267, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
285 Protection of an accused's right to counsel does not put him in an advantageous
position, People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22
(1979), but merely serves to minimize the disadvantages under which an accused, facing the
law enforcement power of the state, labors, People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160-61, 385
N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978).
"I DRL § 240(1), commentary at 164 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see, e.g., Lincoln v.
Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1969); Barkley v.
Barkley, 60 App. Div. 2d 954, 955, 402 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 936,
383 N.E.2d 1154, 411 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1978); Lucey v. Lucey, 60 'App. Div. 2d 757, 757, 400
N.Y.S.2d 610, 610 (4th Dep't 1977). Although the standard of "best interests of the child" is
presently codified in the DRL, the rule existed long before the original enactment of the
statute. See DRL § 240(1), commentary at 164 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The rule ap-
pears to have originated in the case of Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925),
see generally Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword: Current Considerations in
Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683, 685 (1977), wherein Judge Cardozo stated that
the court must act "to do what is best for the interests of the child .... [and to] put [itself]
in the position of a 'wise, affectionate and careful parent.'" Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. at
433, 148 N.E. at 626 (citation omitted). Application of this standard entails the examination
of numerous criteria. See Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current Criteria, 26 DE
PAUL L. REv. 241, 245 (1977). Among these criteria are parental competence, the age, sex
and preference of the child, religious training, and reluctance to separate siblings. Brosky &
Alford, supra, at 686-91. Various devices are used to aid the court in its determination of
what is in the best interests of the child. These devices include interviews of the children
outside the presence of the parties, see, e.g., Todaro v. Todaro, 76 App. Div. 2d 816, 816, 429
N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (1st Dep't 1980), and the use of court-appointed psychiatrists to examine
the children and parents, see, e.g., Salk v. Salk, 89 Misc. 2d 883, 891, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841, 846
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), aff'd, 53 App. Div. 2d 558, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1976).
For a discussion of an approach that proposes the incorporation of social services into the
determination of a child's best interest, see Kirschner, Child Custody Determinations-A
Better Way!, 17 J. FAM. L. 275 (1978-1979).
Interestingly, the early common law perceived the father as having a natural right in
the custody of his children, while the mother was entitled merely to reverence and respect.
